faute de mieux—in the phrase: in presenting its object, a mental act is also implicitly conscious of itself. If it makes sense to say that an experience is itself presented, then its presentation is fundamentally different from the way objects appear. An actual experience appears all at once; it does not have further aspects. It is impossible to imagine how it could occlude itself partly from view; it seems transparent to itself. The term "transparent" is metaphorical, but it is not without descriptive value.1 It captures the fact that, for the perceiver of a tree, there is nothing more to this actual objectpresentation than what is there, which is in manifest contrast with the perceiver or tree itself." /> Philosophy and "experience" - Mattens Filip | sdvig press

Philosophy and "experience"

a conflict of interests?

Filip Mattens

pp. 405-438


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