Seele) and personal mind (Geist) is intertwined with the attempt to integrate the following paradigms into a phenomenologically revised "rational psychology': the subject as a real unity of mental faculties (psychology of faculties), as a set of mental states (experimental psychology), and as a motivated life of intentional acts (personalistic psychology).Husserl's discussion of the mind-body problem takes its departure from the distinction between the body in its physiological functions on the one hand, and as an experiential field on the other. While the layer of bodily sensations supervenes on the layer of corporal causality, according to a law of unilateral foundation similar to epiphenomenalism, the psyche has its own form of causality that cannot be reduced to material processes. Therefore, neither epiphenomenalism nor parallelism are suitable interpretations for Husserl's view.A naturalistic ontology of layers easily allows for the reduction of body and psyche to matter, as if the former could simply be superimposed on the latter. By contrast, a superimposition of the mental on the psychic, which would reduce every social and mental fact to states of mind of individuals, seems less tenable. Therefore, Husserl categorically excludes the possibility that a social ontology could be built on naturalistic presuppositions.If the objectivity of the natural sciences presupposes an ideal structure of an open society of scientists, derived from an idealisation of concrete sociality, then the alleged founding layer appears to be the result of a collective enterprise. To prevent such an aporia, Husserl proposes a different principle of unity, based on an eidetic analysis of the structure of correlation." /> Naturalistische Fundierungsontologie und das transzendentale Organon der Wissenschaften - Caminada Emanuele | sdvig press